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COMPELLING THE TESTIMONY OF
POLITICAL DEVIANTS*

0. John Rogget
History of Immunity Acts
the two specific problems which the new federal act
presents, namely, whether it imposes nonjudicial functions
on federal courts, and whether it should, does and can protect
against the substantial danger of state prosecution, there is a general objection that one can raise against it, and to other acts of the
same type: they relate to the area of belief and opinion, the very
area which was involved when the English people, spearheaded by
the Puritans, engaged in the struggle with the Crown that finally
resulted in the establishment of a right of silence. At least if we
are to have immunity acts, let us confine them to the area in which
most of them have operated in the past, the area of economic regulation.
Immunity acts have a long history. They go back almost to the
time of the establishment of the privilege. However, they have
rarely been applied to the field of dogma.
Perhaps the earliest such act dates from 1697 in the colony of
Connecticut. This act related to witnesses: they were called upon
to give testimony under oath "alwayes provided that no person required to give testimonie as aforesaid shall be punished for what
he doth confesse against himselfe when under oath. " 1 Gs This was
but a short time after the right to remain silent had been extended
to witnesses as distinguished from defendants.1 Go

B

ESIDES

• The first instalment .of this article was published in the December 1956 issue [55
L. REv. 163].-Ed.
t Member, New York Bar; A.B. 1922, University of Illinois, LL.B. 1925, S.J.D. 1931,
Harvard Law School; formerly (1939-40) United States Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice; author, Our Vanishing
Civil Liberties (1949).-Ed.
108 3 COLONIAL RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT ·296 (1689-1706). See also an act of 1703,
id. at •409-410, and one of 1711, 4 id. at •154.
160 For instances as to witnesses see Rex v. Reading, 7 How. St. Tr. 259 at 296 (1679);
Rex v. Whitebread, 7 How. St. Tr. 3ll at 361 (1679); Rex v. Langhorn, 7 How. St. Tr.
417 at 435 (1679); Rex v. Castlemaine, 7 How. St. Tr. 1067 at 1096 (1680); Rex v. Stafford,
7 How. St. Tr. 1293 at 1314 (1680); Rex v. Plunket, 8 How. St. Tr. 447 at 480-481 (1681);
Rex v. Rosewell, IO How. St. Tr. 147 at 169 (1684); Rex v. Oates, 10 How St. Tr. 1079 at
1098-1100, 1123 (1685).
In England the practice of granting a pardon in order to obtain testimony probably
originated even a little earlier than the Connecticut act. See Rex v. Reading, 7 How. St.
MICH.
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The first provision for immunity that attained any general
vogue was in an act against gaming. The initial act was passed in
England in 1710, the same year that marked the death of Lord
Holt, the last English judge to persist in the practice of questioning
a defendant. According to this act the loser could sue the winner
to recover his losses, and the winner had to answer under oath, but
when he had answered and returned what he had won he was to
"be acquitted, indemnified, and discharged from any further or
other punishment, forfeiture, or penalty."170 Similar statutes were
enacted in various of the colonies,171 and even without such enactment the act of 9 Anne, c. 14 was declared to be in force in this
country.172
Thereafter from time to time the people would become concerned about certain conduct, pass an act regulating it, and often
put in an immunity provision. In addition to further acts against
gaming,173 there were acts against lotteries,174 usury,175 bribery of
Tr. 259 at 296 (1679); Rex v. Earl of Shaftesbury, 8 How. St. Tr. 759 at 817 (1681). In
the next century Lord Chief Justice Camden commented in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.
St. Tr. 1030 at 1074 (1765): "Nay, if the vengeance of the government requires a production of the author, it is hardly possible for him to escape the impeachment of the printer,
who is sure to seal his own pardon by his discovery." In Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311,
121 Eng. Rep. 730 (1861), the Queen's Bench held that a pardon took away the right of
silence, and this in spite of the fact that under the Act of Settlement, 1700, 12 & 13 Wm.
3, c. 2, §3, the pardon was not pleadable to an impeachment by the House of Commons.
170 9 Anne, c. 14, §4 (1710).
17118 COLONIAL RECORDS OF GEORGIA 608, 613 (Candler, 1911) (an act of 1764, §4);
2 Acrs AND REsOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY 836, 837 (Boston, 1874)
(an act of 1736-1737, §4); 3 id. at 45, 47 (Boston, 1878) (an act of 1742-1743, §4); 5
COLONIAL LAws OF NEW YORK 621, 623 (an act of 1774); 6 LAws OF VIRGINIA 76, 78
(Hening, 1819) (an act of 1748, §4). South Carolina in 1712 by legislative enactment
provided that statutes made in England since the eighth year of Queen Anne were to
be in force there. The PUBLIC LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 100, appx. 20-21 (Grimke, 1790).
The Georgia statute was held to be constitutional in Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 225 (1853).
The colony of New York also had an immunity provision in an act against private
lotteries. 5 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 639, 642 (an act of 1774).
172 United States v. Dixon, (C.C. D.C. 1830) 25 Fed. Cas. 872 at 873, No. 14,970;
Kn.TY, A REPORT OF ALL SUCH ENGLISH STATUTES 268 (1811) (Maryland).
173 See, e.g., 2 Cal. Codes and Stat. (1876) 1]13,334; Conn. State Stat. (1854) c. 22, §2
(answers not admissible in evidence against one); Ill. Rev. Stat. (1845) c. 46, §5; 2 Ind.
Rev. Stat. (1852) 372, §89; Md. Code (1860) art. 30, §65; 1 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1889) §3819
(testimony may not be used against one); 1 N.Y. Rev. Stat. (2d ed. 1836) 668 (answers
not admissible in subsequent proceedings); 2 N.C. Code (1883) §2843 (answers not admissible in any criminal prosecution); Va. Code (3d ed. 1873) c. 195, §20 (immunity
provision for witnesses). The Missouri provision was held valid in Ex parte Buskelt, 106
Mo. 602, 17 S.W. 753 (1891). The Virginia provision was held not applicable to a lottery
prosecution in Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892 (1881).
174 See,. e.g., I Ind. Rev. Stat. (1888) §1799; 4 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1942) §9-1604;
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §436.510 (3) (testimony not to be used in any prosecution).
175 See, e.g., I Ind. Rev. Stat. (1852) c. 57, §8 (answers not to be used in any criminal
proceeding); I N.Y. Rev. Stat. (2d ed. 1836) 761; N.Y. Laws (1837) c. 430, §8, pp. 487-488
(answers not to be used before any grand jury or on the trial of any indictment). These
provisions were held constitutional. Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153 (1860); Henry v. Bank
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public officials,17 6 duelling,177 frauds on creditors,178 and for the
regulation of the sale of spirituous liquors179 which included im- ·
munity provisions.
Judge Grosscup had the feel of most of these statutes when he
wrote concerning the decisions sustaining their validity: " ... It is
interesting to note, however, that all of these cases related to
offenses, the wisdom of which were then somewhat debated questions, and the prosecution of which was, to some extent, the
triumph or defeat of the prevailing popular opinion.... Some of
these cases naturally aroused the indignation of the community in
which the court sat. All of them were cases, doubtless, where the
immunity claimed by the witness aroused no just sympathy. They
each presented a situation where the fifth amendment, if construed
broadly, seemed to offer an obstacle to a just administration of the
criminal law...." 180
of Salina, 5 Hill (N.Y.) 523 (1843), affirming 1 Hill (N.Y.) 555 (1841); Stevens v. White,
5 Hill (N.Y.) 548 (1843); Perrine &: Pixley v. Striker, 7 Paige (N.Y.) 598 (1839). In
Henry v. Bank of Salina, supra, the court also held that the word plaintiff in the New
York act of 1837 extended to the plaintiff in interest as well as the plaintiff of record,
but in Kempshall v. Burns, 4 Hill (N.Y.) 468 (1842), affirming 24 Wend. (N.Y.) 360 (1840),
held, and in Cloyes v. Thayer, 3 Hill (N.Y.) 564, 566 (1842), stated that a person called
as a witness who was neither, could still claim his privilege. In Henry v. Salina Bank, 1
N.Y. 83 (1847), affirming 2 Denio (N.Y.) 155 (1846), the court reached the same result
on the additional ground that despite the provision in the act of 1837 the witness might
still be subjected to a forfeiture.
176 N.Y. Laws (1853) c. 539, §14, pp. 1012-1013 (testimony not to be used in any
subsequent proceeding); N.Y. Penal Code (Donnan, 5th ed., 1886) §79; Mass. Acts and
Resolves (1871) c. 91, §1, p. 490. Both New York acts were sustained. People v. Kelly, 24
N.Y. 74 (1861); People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427, 14 N.E. 319 (1887). The Massachusetts act
was declared unconstitutional. Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172 (1871).
177 Ark. Stat. (1884) §1792 (testimony not admissible in any subsequent proceeding);
2 Cal. Codes and Stat. (1876) 1]13.232 (testimony not admissible in any subsequent proceeding); 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. (2d ed. 1836) 572 (testimony not admissible in any ~ubsequent
proceeding); Va. Laws (1869-1870) c. 355, §1 (testimony not admissible in any subsequent
proceeding). In Cullen v. Commonwealth, 24 Gratt. (Va.) 624 (1873), the court held that
the Virginia statute was not broad enough to take away the right of silence.
178 N.Y. Code of Civil Procedure §292 (5) (Townshend, 10th ed., 1870) (answers not
to be used in any criminal proceeding); 1 N.C. Code (1883) §488 (5) (answers not to be
used in any criminal proceeding). The New York provision was assumed to be constitutional in Lathrop v. Clapp, 40 N.Y. 328 (1869), and the North Carolina provision was
held constitutional in LaFontaine v. Southern Undenvriters Assn., 83 N.C. 132 (1880).
170 N.H. Gen. Stat. (1867) c. 99, §20 (limited immunity provision for employee). This
section was held constitutional in State v. Nowell, 58 N.H. 314 (1878).
In addition there were a few miscellaneous immunity provisions. Both Arkansas and
California gave a limited grant of immunity to one of two or more conspirators. A DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS, c. 52, §72 (English, 1848); Cal. Laws (1855) c. 82, §5,
p. 106. Indiana provided a limited immunity to a witness whose answer showed the
commission of a misdemeanor. Ind. Rev. Stat. (1881) §1800. All these provisions were
held constitutional. State v. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307 (1853); Ex parte Rowe, 7 Cal, 184
(1857); Bedgood v. State, 115 Ind. 275, 17 N.E. 621 (1888). In State v. Quarles, supra,
the indictment was for gaming at poker.
180 United States v. James, (N.D. Ill. 1894) 60 F. 257 at 261.
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In comparing our accusatorial with the inquisitional system he
commented: "In the one, grew up a criminal procedure that was
almost purely inquisitorial, and whose history now appalls the enlightened conscience; in the other, grew up a system purely accusatory, where the offending individual could lawfully stand in silence,
and demand proof from sources other than himself. In the one, the
power of the sovereign pervaded every nook and corner of the individual; in the other, the power of the sovereign came only to the
outward person of the subject, and there stopped. This jealousy
against any touch, until the right of individual liberty was shown
forfeited, proved the corner stone of popular liberty." In the next
paragraph Judge Grosscup called the privilege the "right of
silence."181 The dissent in the Ullmann case relied heavily on
Judge Grosscup's opinion and referred to the privilege variously
as the "privilege of silence," "federally protected right of silence,"
"this right of silence" and simply "right of silence."182
The first federal act was in 1857. The circumstance which led
to its enactment was the refusal of a correspondent of The New
York Times, James W. Simonton, to disclose to a select committee
of the House of Representatives the names of the members of the
House who had indicated to him that their votes were for sale with
reference to certain measures then pending before Congress.
Simonton had written a letter to the Times on the subject of congressional corruption, which the Times had published over his
initials. The Times had also commented on the subject editorially. These items had led to the appointment of the special committee which had sought Simonton's testimony.183 The result of
his refusal to divulge names was the act of 1857. It provided,
among other things, that a person had to testify, but he was not to
"be held to answer criminally in any court of justice, or subject to
any penalty or forfeiture for any fact or act touching which he shall
be required to testify," and his statements were not to "be competent testimony in any criminal proceeding against such witness
in any court of justice."184
This act was soon abused. Deviants, including at least two who
had already been indicted, arranged to give testimony before a
181 Id. at

263.

182 350 U.S. 422 at 440, 445, 446, 450 (1956).
183 CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d scss., 403-411,

435-444 (1857).
11 Stat. 155 at 156 (1857). In the same year California adopted a similar statute.
Cal. Laws (1857) c. 95, p. 97.
184
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congressional investigating committee, and in this way obtained
immunity.185 The two who were indicted had the indictment
against them dismissed. The indictment was for the embezzlement
of some $2,000,000 of Indian trust bonds from the Interior Department.
Congress accordingly amended the act of 1857 in 1862 by
eliminating the prohibition against prosecution but leaving that
against the subsequent use of testimony given.186 As amended, the
immunity provision of the act of 1857 became in turn Rev. Stat.
§859 (1875), 28 U.S.C. (1940) §634, and 18 U.S.C. (1952) §3486.
It was this immunity provision which was again amended in August 1954 to become the new federal immunity act, and is now
embarked upon what will probably be a larger history than ever
before.
In 1868 Congress adopted companion legislation to the act of
1857 as amended. The occasion this time was the decision by
Vice Chancellor Sir William Page Wood in United States v.
McRae,18 1 affirmed on this point on appeal in an opinion by Lord
Chancellor Chelmsford,188 that the United States in a suit in equity
in England against a Confederate agent could not compel him to
make discovery because this might expose him to a forfeiture in
this country.180 It was this case which the government did not cite
and everyone else overlooked in United States v. Murdock. 100 The
decision on appeal in the McRae case was in December 1867. The
next month a bill was introduced in Congress,101 and passed in
February, which provided that "no discovery, or evidence obtained
by means of any judicial proceeding from any party or witness in
this or any foreign country, shall be given in evidence, or in any
manner used against such party a witness ...." 102 This provision
became Rev. Stat. §860.
At first there was no activity under Rev. Stat. §859, and very
little under Rev. Stat. §860. Several federal courts of first instance
185 CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st sess., 449 (1861); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d sess.,
56, 228, 364 (1861-1862).
186 12 Stat. 333 (1862).
187 L.R. 4 Eq. 327 (1867).
188 L.R. 3 Ch. 79 (1867).
189 CoNc:. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d sess., 1334 (1868). In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 at 632 (1886), Justice Bradley stated that the act of 1868 was passed to alleviate the
search and seizure provisions in the revenue acts of 1863 and 1867, but he in no way
documented his statement.
100 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
191 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d sess., 845 (1868).
102 15 Stat. 37 (1868).
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held that the latter sectiqn took away one's right of silence,193 but
the question did not reach the Supreme Court until the case of
Counselman v. Hitchcock,19 4 decided almost a quarter of a century
after the passage of the act of 1868. In the meantime there had
occurred the expansion of the railroads, their unfair and discriminatory rates and practices, and the passage by Congress, in 1887, of
the Interstate Commerce Act.195 This act contained two limited
immunity provisions,1 96 but the Counselman case did not arise
under these immunity provisions; it arose under Rev. Stat. §860.
A grand jury in Illinois was inquiring whether certain shipments
of grain had been carried for less than the published and legal
tariff rate. The defendant claimed his right of silence, and the
Supreme Court sustained him on the ground that the immunity
provided by Rev. Stat. §860 was not broad enough: it did not include immunity from prosecution. The next year Congress
amended the Interstate Commerce Act by providing that a person
subpoenaed under the provisions of that act had to testify but was
not to "be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for
or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which
he may testify...." 197 Three years later the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this act in Brown v. W alker.1 98
This act became known as the Compulsory Testimony Act of
1893,100 and was sometimes specifically referred to in future immunity provisions.200 The case of Brown v. Walker, with some
exceptions, became the basis for such provisions. The exceptions
included the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, an act of 1917 prohibiting
the manufacture or sale of liquor in Alaska, the Federal Food,
193 United States v. McCarthy, (S.D. N.Y. 1883) 18 F. 87; United States v. Williams,
(S.D. Ohio 1872) 28 Fed. Cas. 670, No. 16,717; United States v. Brown, (D.C. Ore. 1871)
24 Fed. Cas. 1273, No. 14,671; In re Strouse, (D.C. Nev. 1871) 23 Fed. Cas. 261, No. 13,548;
In re Phillips, (D.C. Va. 1869) 19 Fed. Cas. 506, No. 11,097.
194142 U.S. 547 (1892).
10:; 24 Stat. 379.
196 Section 9 [24 Stat. 382 (1887), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §9], and section 12 [24 Stat. 383,
as amended, 26 Stat. 743 at 744 (1891)] ("••• but such evidence or testimony shall not
be used against such person on the trial of any criminal proceeding").
197 27 Stat. 444 (1893), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §46.
198 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
199 See, e.g., 56 Stat. 23 at 30, §202 (g} (1942) (Emergency Price Control Act of 1942);
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 at 3, n.2, 4 (1948).
200 See, e.g., 32 Stat. 828 (1903); 42 Stat. 1002 (1922), 7 U.S.C. (1952) §1'5 (Grain
Futures Act); 56 Stat. 30 (1942) (Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); 56 Stat. 297
(1942), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §1017 (a) (Freight Forwarders Act); 60 Stat. 770, 771, 42 U.S.C.
(1952) §1812 (a) (3) (Atomic Energy Act of 1946); 63 Stat. 8, 50 U.S.C. Appx. (1952)
§2026 (b) (Export Control Act - of 1949); 63 Stat. 27, 28-29, 50 U.S.C. Appx. (1952)
§1896 (f) (6) (Housing and Rent Act of 1949); 68 Stat. 948, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1956)
§2201 (c) (Atomic Energy Act of 1954).
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Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, and the Internal Security Act of 1950.201 These
acts for some reason used the old form of immunity provision, and
forbade only the subsequent use of the testimony or statement obtained. The provision in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 came before
the Supreme Court and was of course held not to take away an
individual's right of silence.202 Nevertheless, the provision was
not only retained but even further restricted, in 1938, to "except
such testimony as may be given" by the bank'.rupt "in the hearing
upon objections to his discharge."203
In February 1903, as part of a legislative program for the correction of corporate abuses, Congress put immunity provisions in
three different statutes: the act establishing the Department of
Commerce and Labor, which conferred upon a commissioner of
corporations investigatory powers similar to those possessed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission; 204 the Elkins Amendment205 to
the Interstate Commerce Act; and an act making large appropriations for the enforcement of the Interstate Commerce Act, the
Sherman Law and other enactments.206 Three years later District
Judge Humphrey, in a case involving an indictment in Illinois
against the members of the "beef trust" for alleged violations of
the Sherman Act, sustained pleas in bar of the individual defendants, although not of the corporate defendants, on the ground
that the individual defendants had obtained immunity by making
available to the federal commissioner of corporations at his demand, certain books and records.207 However, these defendants
had not been subpoenaed and they had not been put under oath.
There was sharp criticism of this decision. President Theodore
Roosevelt declared that it came "measurably near to making the
law a farce," and asked Congress to "pass a declaratory act stating
its real intention."208 Congress thereupon enacted that the immunity granted by the act of 1893 and the three acts of February
1903 was to "extend only to a natural person who, in obedience to
20130 Stat. 544 at 548 (1898); 39 Stat. 903 at 906 (1917); 52 Stat. 1040 at 1057 (1938),
21 U.S.C. (1952) §373; 61 Stat. 163 at 168 (1947), 7 U.S.C. (1952) §135 (c); 64 Stat. 987 at
991-992 (1950), 50 u.s.c. (1$52) §783 (f).
202 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1923); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355
(1923); Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920).
203 52 Stat. 840 at 847, 11 U.S.C. (1952) §25 (a)(lO).
204 32 Stat. 825 at 828 (1903).
205 32 Stat. 847 at 848-849 (1903), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §43.
206 32 Stat. 854 at 904 (1903), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §32, 49 U.S.C. (1952) §47.
207 United States v. Armour&: Co., (N.D. Ill. 1906) 142 F. 808.
208 H.R. Doc. No. 706, 59th Cong., 1st sess., 3 (1906).,
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a subpoena, gives testimony under oath or produces evidence,.
documentary or otherwise, under oath."200
During all this period both Rev. Stat. §§859 and 860 continued
on the books. In 1910 Congress repealed section 860 210 on the
ground that after the Counselman211 decision it had "become a
shield to the criminal and an obstruction to justice."212 But for
some reason Congress overlooked section 859; it remained in force
to become, as we have seen, the new federal immunity act.
Later in 1910 Congress passed the Mann Act and in 1914 the
first Federal Trade Commission Act, and included in both a broad
immunity provision.213 The one in the latter act was similar to the
one in the act of 1893 as amended in 1906. Between this time and
the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 Congress passed seven
more acts which contained similar immunity provisions: the Shipping Act of 1916;214 an act creating a tariff commission; 215 the National Prohibition Act of 1919; 216 the Packers and Stockyards
Act; 2 n the Grain Futures Act; 218 the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930;210 and the Tariff Act of 1930.220
With the Securities Act of 1933 came a new refinement. The
careful drafters of that act provided that in order to get immunity
a person first had to claim his privilege.221 Since then Congress
has enacted thirty regulatory measures which contained immunity
provisions. Twenty-four of these measures contained the refined
form of immunity provision in the Securities Act of 1933.222 0£
the remainder, three used the older style of the 1893 act as amended
200 34 Stat. 798 (1906), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §33, 49 U.S.C. (1952) §48.
210 36 Stat. 352.
211 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
212 H.R. Rep. 266, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 2 (1910).
213 36 Stat. 826 at 827, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §2424 (b); 38 Stat. 717 at 723, 15 U.S.C. (1952)

§49.
214 39 Stat. 728 at 737, 46 U.S.C. (1952) §827.
2m 39 Stat. 795 at 797 (1916).
216 41 Stat. 305 at 317.
217 42 Stat. 159 at 168 (1921), 7 U.S.C. (1952) §222.
218 42 Stat. 998 at 1002 (1922), 7 U.S.C. (1952) §15.
210 46 Stat. 531 at 536-537, 7 U.S.C. (1952) §499m (f).
220 46 Stat. 700 (1930), 19 U.S.C. (1952) §1333 (c).
22148 Stat. 86 (1933), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §77v (c).
222 48 Stat. 881 at 900, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §78u (d) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 48
Stat. 1064 at 1097, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §409 (1) (Communications Act of 1934); 48 Stat. 1113
at 1114 (1934) (an act to amend the Air Commerce Act of 1926); 49 Stat. 449 at 456
(1935), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §161 (3) (National Labor Relations Act); 49 Stat. 803 at 832, 15
U.S.C. (1952) §79r(e) (Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935); 49 Stat. 838 at 858
(1935), 16 U.S.C. (1952) §825f (g) (Federal Power Act); 49 Stat. 1985 at 1991 (1936), 46
U.S.C. (1952) §1124 (c) (Merchant Marine Act); 50 Stat. 72 at 87 (Bituminous Coal Act
of 1937); 52 Stat. 821 at 828-829 (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §717m (h); 52 Stat. 973 at 1022-
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in 1906; 223 and three simply forbade the subsequent use of any
evidence or ·statement obtained.224 The drafters of the Securities
Act of 1933 proved to be foresighted on behalf of the government,
for in United States v. Monia225 the Supreme Court held that under the older form, in that case one of the acts of February 1903 as
amended in 1906, a witness got immunity even though he had not
made any claim, to his right of silence.
A history of immunity acts thus shows three things. Such acts
began almost as soon as the right of silence established itself. However, they were almost never of general application but always
limited to a particular area. For instance, although Congress has
passed at least fifty acts containing immunity provisions, all but
two, Rev. Stat. §§859 and 860, have been restricted to specific types
of violations. Most important of all, immunity acts generally have
not applied to deviations from prevalent beliefs, thoughts, opinions, associations, and utterances-the fields also protected by the
guarantees of the First Amendment. On the contrary, nearly all
1023, 49 U.S.C. (1952) §644 (i) (Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938); 52 Stat. 1094 at 1107
(1938), 45 U.S.C. (1952) §362 (c) (Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act); 53 Stat. 1360
at 1370, 42 U.S.C. (1952) §405 (f) (Social Securily Act Amendments of 1939); 54 Stat. 847
at 853-854, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §80b-9 (d) (Investment Company Act of 1940); 56 Stat. 23 at
30 (Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); 56 Stat. 284 at 297 (1942), 49 U.S.C. (1952)
§1017 (a) (Freight Fonvarders Act); 56 Stat. 176 at 179 (1942), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §1152 (a) (4)
(Second War Powers Act); 60 Stat. 755 at 770-771, 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1812 (a) (3) (Atomic
Energy Act of 1946); 61 Stat. 136 at 150-151 (Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947);
62 Stat. 101 at 106-107 (1948), 50 U.S.C. Appx. (1952) §1931 (b); 63 Stat. 7 at 8, 50 U.S.C.
Appx. (1952) §2026 (b) (Export Control Act of 1949); 63 Stat. 18 at 27, 28-29, 50 U.S.C.
Appx. (1952) §1896 (f) (6) (Housing and Rent Act of 1949); 64 Stat. 798 at 816-817, 50
U.S.C. Appx. (1952) §2155 (b) (Defense Production Act of 1950); 64 Stat. 873 at 882-883
(1950), 12 U.S.C. (1952) §1820 (d) (Federal Deposit Insurance Act); 68 Stat. 919 at 948,
42 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1956) §2201 (c) (Atomic Energy Act of 1954).
223 49 Stat. 543 at 550 (Motor Carrier Act of 1935); 49 Stat. 872 at 875 (1935), 53
Stat. 363 (1939), 26 U.S.C. (1952) §3119 (Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act); 52
Stat. 1060 at 1065, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §209 (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938).
224 See note 201 supra.
22r, 317 U.S. 424 (1943). The history of federal immunity provisions has been a topic
of discussion on several occasions in Supreme Court opinions. There are such discussions
in the Monia case in the majorily opinion of Justice Roberts, at 427-430, as well as the
minority one of Justice Frankfurter, at 432-438. For further such discussions see Smith v.
United States, 337 U.S. 137 at 146-148 (1949); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 at 327,
335-340 (1950). See also Dixon, "The Fifth Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes,''
22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 447 at 450-467 (1954).
A partial catalog of federal immunity provisions may be found in Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. I at 6, 7, n.4 (1948). That case held that a claim of privilege as to certain
records did not give immunity under an applicable immunity provision, for the reason
that the records in question, a!Lhough only the customary records of the defendant, were
required to be kept under regulations of the Price Administrator and thus became public
documents. The disturbing implications of the required records doctrine are pointed out
in Dixon, supra, at 554, 560-567. But cf. Meltzer, "Required Records, the McCarran Act,
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," 18 UNIV. CHI. L. REv 687 at 708-728 (1951).
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federal immunity provisions have been in statutes providing for
some form of economic regulation.
The fact th~t until the present period federal immunity pro•
visions have not been directed at the field of heresy increases in
significance when we remember that the right of silence had its
growth in this very field and that it made its greatest gains during
the time of the Puritan opposition to then constituted authorities.
It is not inappropriate to point out that the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures grew up in the same field.
What the Puritans and Lilburne did in the 1600's for the right to
remain silent, John Wilkes did in the next century for the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Coke had already said that a man's house was his castle.226 But it_ took Wilkes
and No. 45 of his paper, the North Britain, to give content to the
statement. This number came out in April 1763 and contained a
biting criticism of George Hi's message to Parliament. The king's
ministers regarded it as a seditious libel and Lord Halifax, one of
the secretaries of state, issued a general warrant for the apprehen•
sion of the authors, printers and publishers. This warrant was
ruled to be illegal, and the various resulting actions against the
king's messengers were estimated to have cost the government as
much as I 00,000 pounds.227 Wilkes recovered 4000 pounds from
Lord Halifax himself. Then in 1765, in Entinck v. Carrington,228
Lord Camden, with the unanimous concurrence of the other judges
of his court, ruled that general search warrants were illegal. To
permit them, he re3<soned, "would be subversive of all the comforts
of society.''229 Justice Bradley later stated, in his opinion for the
court in Boyd v. United States,230 that Lord Camden's "great judg·
ment on that occasion is considered as one of the landmarks of
English liberty." Thereafter the elder Pitt, Lord Chatham, could
declare eloquently: "The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the crown. It may be frail-its roof may
shake-the wind may blow through it-the storm may enter-the
rain may enter-but the King of England cannot enterl-all his
force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement! " 231
226 3

INsr. •162. In Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a at 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (1603),

the court stated: "That the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well
for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose••••"
227 3 MAY, CONSTITIJTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 7th ed.,
228 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
229 Id. at 1066.
230 116 U.S. 616 at 626 (1886).
231 BROUGHAM, H1sroRICAL SKETCHES OF STATESMEN WHO

GEORGE III 42 (1858).

6, 7 (1882).

FLOURISHED IN THE TIME OF
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It was this kind of regard for the dignity of the individual, plus
the traditional English opposition to the inquisitional system,
traits shown especially in the treatment accorded dissenters in
religion and politics, that, together with the great reluctance of
the Puritans to name their associates, led to the final establishment
of the right of silence. Although today one cannot legally claim
this right to protect an associate, 232 District Judge Grosscup nevertheless correctly understood the history and circumstances of its
growth when in the course of his opinion holding the Immunity
Act of 1893 to be unconstitutional he expressed the fear that with
such an act "the government could probe the secrets of every conversation, or society, by extending compulsory pardon to one of its
participants, and thus turn him into an involuntary informer."233
Those who submitted the Minority Report in the House on S. 16
shared this view. They said: "By this device to compel testimony,
we turn men of conscience into informers. This is nasty business. "234
Furthermore, the successful resistance of the English people to
the inquisitional system was part of a yet larger picture, one which
included additional individual rights such as those to bail, habeas
corpus, a public trial, and to be confronted with the witnesses
against one, as well as the successful struggle of the English people
against the Stuarts and of the American colonists against George
III, the rise of the idea of the supremacy of law, and the final supremacy of law over royal prerogative. The larger picture was
also to contain the protection of various confidential relationships,
such as that between attorney and client, and husband and wife,
and the recognition of a general right of privacy. Important instrumentalities in the development of individual rights were a
rather independent bench and bar, and a court and jury system.
When Bentham,235 and Wigmore236 after him, explained the right
of silence on the ground that the English people were so aroused
over the abuses of power by the high commission and the court of
star champer that they got rid not only of these courts but of their
inquisitional methods as well, they did not take a comprehensive
enough view of history.
If one were to give a brief characterization of the English and
v. United States, 340 U.S. 867 (1951).
United States v. James, (N.D. lll. 1894) 60 F. 257 at 264.
234 H.R. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 18 (1954).
235 5 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, bk. 9, pt. 4, c. 8, PP· 241-245 {182i).
236 8 EVIDENCE, !Id ed., §2250, p. 800 (1940).
232 Rogers
233
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American approach to deviants, and to people generally one would
say that it tended to be equalitarian. We have a regard for human
dignity. We treat people as adults rather than as children. This
is one of the basic differences between us and the east. Our approach is a more mature one. The result is a comparatively independent citizenry, and a more or less representative form of
government.
The holding in Brown v. Walker,231 based as it is on an insufficient appreciation of the history and nature of the right of silence,
should not have been extended beyond the field of economic regulation. Chief Judge Clark of the Second Circuit said in concurring reluctantly in the affirmance of the Ullmann case: "I concur,
but regretfully. For the steady and now precipitate erosion of the
Fifth Amendment seems to me to have gone far beyond anything
within•the conception of those justices of the Supreme Court who
by the narrowest of margins first gave support to the trend in the
1890s. And serious commentators have found this new statute
peculiarly disturbing in policy and in law.... It undermines and
so far forth nullifies one of the basic differences between our
justice and that of systems we condemn, namely the principle that
the individual shall not be forced to condemn himself." 238
Specifically, the holding in Brown v. Walker should not have
been extended to the field of beliefs. If that means a different result
in cases involving economic regulation than in those involving
beliefs, that will not be out of character for us either. Contrary to
what the communists would have the world believe, we place as
high a value on the worth of the individual as any group on earth.
We give considerably more latitude to the individual in the expression of his opinions than in the conduct of his business affairs.
A judge who spoke for us most ably on this point was Justice
Holmes, and of his opinions Justice Frankfurter wrote: "Accordingly, Mr. Justice Holmes was far more ready to find legislative
invasion where free inquiry was involved than in the debatable
area of economics."230
Those who submitted the Minority Report in the House on
S. 16 drew substantially the distinction we have suggested. After
referring to the powers of various special agencies of the executive
branch of government to grant immunity, they said: "Furthermore, the functions of these agencies are generally related to the
237161 U.S. 591 (1896).
United States v. Ullmann, (2d Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 760 at 763.
239 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 at 95 (1949).
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field of economic regulation where their inquiries touch more
upon the rights of corporations, to which no privilege against incrimination attaches, than to the rights of individuals."240 Near
the end of their report they added: "We are dealing here with elements of the First as well as the Fifth amendment of the Constitution. "241
Dean Erwin N. Griswold of the Harvard Law School drew the
distinction we are urging when he ·wrote:
"Where matters of a man's belief or opinions or political
views are essential elements of the charge, it may be m~st difficult to get evidence from sources other than the suspected or
accused person himself. Hence, the significance of the privilege over the years has perhaps been greatest in connection
with resistance to prosecution for such offenses as heresy or
political crimes. In these areas the privilege against selfincrimination has been a protection for freedom of thought
and a hindrance to any government which might wish to prosecute for thoughts and opinions alone."242
In discussing the inferences to be drawn from a claim of a right
of silence, he stressed the same distinction:
". . . The question whether a bank teller stole funds entrusted to him is one sort of question. But the closer the questions asked get to the area of opinion and political belief, the
less significant, I suggest to you, is the refusal to answer questions. Or, to put this another way, the more the interrogation gets into what might be called the free-speech area of the
First Amendment, the more difficult it is to come up surely
with a sound inference from the refusal to answer a question. "243
If supporters of the new federal act point out that it applies to
treason, sabotage and espionage as well as sedition, the answer is
that charges of treason as well as sedition were the traditional way
in which monarchs compelled conformity in politics and religion.
Such charges were a favorite weapon of Henry VIII.
If some of the supporters of the new federal act were to suggest
that if the English people had been more harsh with the Puritans,
the latter might never have come to power, the answer is that
probably the very leniency of the English people kept their civil
H.R. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 12 (1954).
Id. at 15.
242 THE FIFrH AMENDMENT TODAY 8-9 (1955), quoted with approval by the dissent in
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 at 449, n.3 (1956).
248 Id. at 58-59.
240
241
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war from being worse than it was and made possible the bloodless
revolution of 1688 and the bill of rights of 1689. One can point
to a country where the authorities used methods with dissenters that
left little to be desired in the way of harshness-Russia-and with
fearful results. The czars sent a steady trek of political exiles to
Siberia. Ironically enough, in the decade when this trek was reaching its height, from 1875-1885, Friedrich Engels was adding to
Marxism the idea of the withering ·away of the state. The destructive concepts of Marxism flourished in the minds of the repressed
nihilists, and the result was a ruthless as well as a bloody revolution.
The new federal immunity act is a further step in the direction
of an inquisitional system, and one which we ought not to have
taken.
Basis of the Right of Silence
The new federal act, and immunity acts generally, are subject
to a further general objection: they are contrary to the regard for
the individual which led to the creation of a right of silence. As
the dissent in the Ullmann case aptly put it, "The Fifth Amendment protects the conscience and the dignity of the individual, as
well as his safety and security, against the compulsion of government."244 Or as Justice Field, quoting with approval these words
of counsel, James C. Carter, in his day the leader of the American
bar, put it in his dissenting opinion in Brown v. Walker,245
" ... both the safeguard of the Constitution and the common-law
rule spring alike from that sentiment of personal self-respect, liberty, independence, and dignity, which has inhabited the breasts
of English speaking peoples for centuries, and to save which they
have always been ready to sacrifice many governmental facilities
and conveniences...." 246 A reexamination of the growth of this
right in the light of the knowledge which has accumulated since
Wigmore first made his study, and a reappraisal of it in the light
of the use that the communists have made of the inquisitional technique and the plethora of confessions they have obtained as a
result, will enhance one's esteem of this right.
Each new period of human history to some extent makes its
own restatement of the past. This does not mean that facts are
altered, but rather that new events and the increase of knowledge
make us give a new evaluation to some facts which were indifferently treated before, and take note of others which were overlooked.
244 350 U.S. 422
245 161 U.S. 591
246 Id. at 632.

at 449 (1956).
(1896).
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Over sixty years ago Wigmore did a comprehensive survey of
the growth of the right to remain silent.247 He concluded that the
first few hundred years of the growth of this right represented
purely a jurisdictional struggle between the state and the church
and between the common law courts and the ecclesiastical courts.
The later researches of Mary Hume Maguire248 and Professor E. M.
Morgan249 showed that more was involved, even in the early history, than simply disputes over the scope of the authority of various
officials. The most important element that was involved was an
opposition to the inquisitional technique as such. But Professor
Morgan's study came too late for him and that of Mrs. Maguire he
refused to take seriously.250 It is time for a new examination.
When the Supreme Court in June 1949, on the occasion of
invalidating confessions in three different cases from three different
states, South Carolina, Pennsylvania and Indiana,251 commented,
"Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system,''252
it was referring to the thousand years and more of history with
which we are here concerned. In primitive societies the important
agency in the regulation of human affairs was not the state, or a
king, or a feudal lord. Rather it was the kinship group. A person's rights depended not on his relation to the state, or to a lord,
but on his position in the kindred. Similarly, an offense was regarded not as against the state but as against the party injured or
his kindred. If a life had been taken, the offense was against the
slain person's kindred, and they were his avengers. Accordingly,
in the centuries before the ll00's in England and the 1200's in
France the prosecution of offenses (except where the offender was
caught in the act or as a result of a chase on a hue and cry) was in
most instances by the person who had been injured or by his kindred.
Also, in those early times the methods for determining issues
were completely different, except for the survival to the present
time of the use of oaths, from anything we know today. The early
modes of proof were three-fold: the ordeal; oaths of one's self and
247 "Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere," 5 HARV. L. R.Ev. 71 (1891). He enlarged upon
his study in "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination; Its History," 15 HARv. L. R.Ev. 610
(1902). This material was embodied in §2250 of his work on evidence.
248 "Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio as Administered in the
Ecclesiastical Court in England" in EssAYS IN HISTORY AND PoLmCAL THEORY IN HONOR
OF CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN 199 (1936).
249 Morgan, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," 34 MINN. L. R.Ev. I (1949).
250 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2250, n.l (1940).
2;;1 Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68; ·Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62; Watts
v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49.
2:>2 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 at 54.
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one's kindred (or compurgation as later legal antiquaries, borrowing a term from ecclesiastical sources, were to call it); and trial by
battle.253 AU these modes of proof had one thing in common: they
were irrational. They depended not on reasoning, but on a belief
in magic. They all reflected primitive thinking. God would
demonstrate where the truth lay. He would ·wreak his vengeance
on those who swore falsely. He would choose the victor.
In the 800's and the following centuries in Western Europe two
changes slowly occurred in the treatment of deviants. The state
gradually took over the prosecution of offenses, and the older
modes of proof became obsolete. It was the accusational and inquisitional systems which supplanted the older modes of proof.
The accusatorial method was developed by the state. It owes much
to Henry II, a wise administrator, and one of the greatest of English
kings (1154-1189). He laid the basis for the survival and growth
of the accusatorial system in England by his extension of an institution which the Frankish kings created in the 800's, the inquiry
of neighbors, the ancestor of our grand and petit juries. The inquisitional technique was created by the church. It was devised
by Innocent III, an outstanding papal legislator, and one of the
greatest of popes (1198-1216). The two systems represent basically
opposite approaches in the treatment of deviants and fundamentally different methods for the investigation and proof of offenses.
Under the accusatorial method there is an insistence that the investigating authorities get their case from other sources than the
mouth of the accused. Under the inquisitional system the investigators try to get their case from this very source. It is this
difference which accounts for the fact that we do not have the
quantity of confessions that communist regimes do.
Looked at in one way the accusatorial method was centuries
older even than Henry II, for it may be said that primitive tribal
justice already had this characteristic. It was accusatorial in the
sense that the state did not prosecute, and hence did not question,
deviants. In England the administration of justice remained accusatorial because of the development of the grand and petit jury
system.
In the 800's, in Western Europe, tribal society was becoming
feudal. With the Vikings attacking from the north and the
253 Apparently trial by battle did not at first exist in England. The Normans under
William the Conqueror brought it over in 1066. But then it had its day.
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Saracens from the south, kinship ties gave way to the lord-man
relationship. The authority of the state waxed; that of the kindred
waned. After the Norman conquest feudalism in England became an elaborately organized and symmetrical system due to
William the Conqueror's enfeoffment of his captains. As the
state's power grew, so too did its jurisdiction over offenses. One
of the ways in which the state increased its jurisdiction in this area
was by an extension of the king's peace. William the Conqueror
announced that his peace included all men, English as well as
Norman.
In the 800's, too, the Frankish kings broke through the bounds
of the old tribal customs and, where their finances were concerned,
abandoned the older modes of proof. The customary moot hill
courts with their magical, superstitious procedures were no
longer good enough for the Frankish kings when their revenues
were involved. They established a new procedure, one unknown
to the old Germanic law. This procedure had the name of inquisitio patriae, more generally known as the enquete du pays, the
inquiry of the country or the country-side-the inquiry of neighbors. In 829 an ordinance of Louis I, le Debonnaire, or the Pious
(814-840), the third and surviving son of Charlemagne, provided
that every inquiry with reference to the royal fisc was to be by the
inquisitio, the inquiry of neighbors. This kind of inquisitio is to
be distinguished from the later inquisitio of the church, the inquiry
by officials. It was the Frankish inquisitio which the Normans
adopted and developed, and which became our grand and petit
jury system.
At first in England the inquiry of neighbors was this: a public
official summoned a group of responsible neighbors, put them
under oath, and asked them to give him a true answer to some
question. It might be a question of fact; it might be a question of
law; or it might be what we speak of as a mixed question of fact
and law. Who owned certain land? What were the customs in
their district? What were the local rights of the king? And the
like. Henry II took this institution and step by step extended it,
now to disputes like these and now like those, and now to find out
whether any crimes had been committed, until in the course of
time it became the usual one in the administration of justice.
About 400 years after the Frankish kings started the inquiry
of neighbors, Innocent III fashioned inquiry by officials. He developed this procedure in a series of decretals beginning in 1199,
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possibly ll98, and perfected it in a decretal of the Fourth Lateran
Council of 1215-1216.254 Under it an official, by virtue of his
office (ex officio),2 55 had power to make a person before him take
an oath to tell the truth to the full extent of his knowledge as to
all things he would be questioned about.
In setting up his new procedure, Innocent, following in the
traces of the Roman law, provided for three forms of action: accusatio, denunciatio, and inquisitio. In accusatio an accuser
formally brought suit and was subject to the talio in case of failure.
In denunciatio a person gave information about an offense to the
appropriate official but did not himself become a formal accuser
or party to the suit. In inquisitio the inquisitor, without any
denunciation, cited a suspect, having him imprisoned if necessary.
Howev~r, under Innocent's decretals, the inquisitor was not supposed to proceed by this third method without some basis, either
common report ("per famam") or notorious suspicion ("per
clainosam insinuationem" ). In practice the third form, the inquisitio, became the invariable rule. At the same time the safeguards which Innocent III provided were ignored.256
Just as the inquiry of neighbors, so the inquiry by officials, was
a radical departure from the old modes of proof, including compurgation. In compurgation one swore to a set formula. One's
oath helpers swore, for instance, that their principal's oath was
clean and unperjured. That was all there was to it. But under the
inquisitional oath one swore to tell the truth in response to questions, substantially after the modern manner. It was this system
which spread throughout Christendom and to the organs of the
state on the mainland of Europe, beginning in France. The point
of departure in France was the Ordinance of 1260 of St. Louis. By
this ordiI_iance he forbade trial by battle in the king's courts, and
254 Esmein finds the earliest instance of the inquisitio procedure in a decretal of 1198.
HISTOIRE DE LA PROCEDURE" CRIMINELLE EN FRANCE (1882), translated in 5 CONTINENTAL
LEGAL HISTORY SERIES 80 (1913). But Wigmore, Pollock and Maitland, Tanon, and
Hinschius are of the opinion that the first reference to the inquisitio procedure as a
generic method was in a decrelal of 1199. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2250, n. 28 (1940);
2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 2d ed., 657, n.4 (1898).
2ii5 This phrase, which became identified in England with the inquisitio procedure of
the church, apparently derives from one of Innocent's decretals of 1199. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2250, n.28 (1940).
250 For a full description of the inquisitional procedure of the church, both in theory
and practice, see I LEA, A HISTORY OF THE INQUISITION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 310-440 (1888);
THE INQUISmON OF THE MIDDLE AGES 1-133 (1954). Hinschius also related that in the
inquisitio procedure the safeguards came to be disregarded. 6 SYSTEM DES KATHOLISCHEN
K.lRCHENKRECHTS MIT RUCKSICHT AUF DEUTSCHLAND 68-71 (1897).
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substitu~ed for it a procedure which he borrowed from the practice of the ecclesiastical courts: witpesses were to appear before
certain delegates of the judge and be questioned. These delegates
were to question the witnesses separately and artfully ("subtilement").257
The difference between the inquisitio of the Frankish and
English kings and the inquisitio of the church, between the inquiry
of neighbors and the secret and artful questioning of witnesses by
officials, was subtle yet fundamental. Under the inquiry of neighbors it was the neighbors who sat in judgment; under inquiry by
officials, it was some official. The inquiry of neighbors was to help
in the development of a fairly independent and relatively more
mature citizenry, and a more or less representative form of government; inquiry by officials was not. Of cour~e, tp.e secret and artful
questioning of witnesses was more rational than the old modes of
proof.· Also, the use of secrecy need not necessarily have been an
evil. After all, our grand jury proceedings are secret, too. The
vice lay in the use of secret questioning, not by a grand jury, but
by a professional class, at a time when safeguards for persons who
stood accused had not yet been developed. In England those safeguards were developed in connection with the jury system.
The English people resisted the oath ex officio, as the inquisitional procedure came to be designated, precisely because it was
inquisitional. Fundamentally, what was involved was a struggle
between two different ways of dealing with deviants. Especially
to the English and American people there was something improper
about putting a person on oath and questioning him. They raised
various objections to this procedure: one was entitled to be tried
in one's vicinity; to be presented formally with the charges against
one; to know one's accusers; one ought not to be questioned about
the secret thoughts of one's heart; thought should be free; and
last but not least, one was not bound to be one's own accuser. An
important reason for insisting that one should not be made to accuse one's self was to avoid becoming an informer on members of
one's family, and on one's friends and associates. The people who
made these objections were also the ones who at the same time and
in the same struggle developed various protective rights to those
who stood accused, such as that to bail, habeas corpus, a public
21!7 EsMEIN, HISTOIRE DE LA PROCEDURE CRIMINELLE EN FRANCE
CoNTINENTAL l.EcAL HISTORY SERIES 80 at 106 (1913).

(1882), translated in 5
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trial, to be confronted with the witnesses against one, to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures, and to be represented by
independent counsel of one's own choice. They secured for themselves a number of personal freedoms, such as that of speech and
the press, as well as the right peaceably to assemble. They safeguarded from inquiry various confidential communications, between husband and wife, attorney and client, and, in this .country,
doctor and patient, and priest and penitent. They evolved an individual right of privacy, a right to be let alone. 258 It is relevant
further to note that the attorney and client privilege went back to
the reign of Elizabeth I,259 to a time shortly before the final struggle for the successful establishment of the privilege against selfincrimination began. Viewed in this light the struggle against the
oath ex officio transcends jurisdictional questions. The privilege
against self-incrimination becomes more than just that. It becomes in truth a right to remain silent. The English and American people accorded to the individual not only freedom of speech
but also, under certain circumstances, a right of silence.
There were three periods when the English people vigorously
resisted the inquisitional technique. Characteristically the resistance during each of these periods was to inquiries into either
religious or political heresy. The first period began in 1246, when
Robert Grosseteste, the crusading Bishop of Lincoln used the oath
ex officio in a general inquisition throughout his extensive diocese.
This was scarcely a decade after Cardinal Otto, papal legate, introduced the oath ex officio into England. The second period was
during the reign of Henry VIII, after another Bishop of Lincoln
started hunting heresy. The third was during the reigns of Elizabeth I and the first two Stuarts, James I and Charles I. This time
the opposition to the inquisitional oath was spearheaded by the
Puritans. The Puritans and others then out of sympathy with the
governing authorities made it plainer than had their predecessors
that the objections to the oath ex officio were based not only on
the fact that it enabled inquiry into the secret thoughts and knowledge of a person's heart, but also made him into an informer on
2~s The basic work on this point is of course the article by Warren and Brandeis,
"The Right to Privacy," 4 HARV. L. R.Ev. 193 (1890). For a recent case collecting many
authorities, see Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, (D.C. Conn. 1953) ll6 F. Supp. 538.
259 Berd v. Lovelace, Cary 62, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (1576-1577); Kelway v. Kelway, Cary
89, 21 Eng. Rep. 47 (1579-1580); Dennis v. Codrington, Cary 100, 21 Eng. Rep. 53 (15791580).
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his family, neighbors and friends. One of the Puritan leaders,
James Morice, a lawyer and a member of Parliament, wrote a tract
against the oath which was published in 1590, shortly after the
last and final struggle against the inquisitional oath had begun.
In it he explained that by the use of this oath the ecclesiastical
judge could require a person "to accuse himselfe even of his most
secret and inward thoughtes, or contrarie to christian charitie, yea
humanitie it selfe, constrayning him to enforme against his natural! parentes, dearest friends, and nearest neighbors, or to bewray with griefe of heart such matters of secrecie, as otherwise
were inconvenient peradventure not honest to be revealed." He
went on to tell how in the reign of Henry VIII the "bloudie
Bishop" of Lincoln by the oath ex officio "constrayned the children
to accuse their parentes, the parentes their naturall children, the
wife her husbande, ·the husbande his wife, one brother and sister
another." 260
In July 1590, when the Puritan minister, John Udall, refused
to tell the high commission whether he was the author of a certain
book he frankly explained: "My lord, I think the author, for any
thing I know, did well, and I ,know that he is enquired after to be
punished; and therefore I think it my duty to hinder the finding
of him out, which I cannot do better than thus." 261 Later when the
oath was urged upon him he offered to take an oath of allegiance
to the queen but refused to take the inquisitional oath, saying,
". . . but to swear to accuse myself or others, I think you have no
law for it."262 Yet another Puritan leader, the preacher, Thomas
Cartwright, who was before the high commission in September
1590, was reluctant to take the oath "lest by his answer upon oath
in this case others might be prejudiced, who would refuse to answer upon theirs." 263 Daniel Neal in his History of the Puritans,
in discussing the course of Cartwright and of fifteen more who followed his example, stated: "The rest of Cartwright's brethren refusing the oath for the same reason, viz., because they would not
accuse themselves, nor bring their friends into trouble. . . ." 264
260 MORICE, A BRIEFE TREATISE OF OATHES 10 and 11 (1590). John Strype stated that
Morice wrote a tract against the oath in 1590. 1 THE LIFE AND Acrs OF JOHN WHITGIFT
•339 (1822). See 1 NEAL, THE HISI'ORY OF THE PURITANS 196 (Toulmin's ed., with additional notes by Choules, 1855).
261 1 How. St. Tr. 1271 at 1274 (1590).
262 Id. at 1275.
263 1 STRYPE, THE LIFE AND Acrs OF JOHN WHITGIFT •333 (1822).
264 1 NEAL, THE HISTORY OF THE PURITANS 194 (Toulmin, 1855).
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There were of course those who confessed and disclosed who attended their meetings. As to them Neal commented,"... but the
worst part of their confession was their discovering the names of
the brethren that were present, which brought them into
trouble."265 Earlier in his work he related: "When the prisoners
were brought to the bar, the court immediately tendered them the
oath to answer all questions to the best of their knowledge, by
which they were obliged not only to accuse themselves, but frequently to bring their relations and friends into trouble." 266 One
will note that in all this, nothing was said of the use of any torture.
When the lord keeper in 1637 asked John Lilburne, a leader
of the Levellers, who was before the court of star chamber on a
charge of importing certain objectionable books, why he refused
to take the oath, he answered: "My honourable Lord, I have answered fully before sir John Banks to all things that belong to me
to answer unto: and for other things, which concern other men, I
have nothing to do with them." The lord keeper persisted: "But
why do you refuse to take the Star-Chamber oath?" Lilburne
responded: " ... though I had fully answered all things that belong
to me to answer unto . . . yet that would not satisfy and give content, but other things were put unto me, concerning other men,
to insnare me, and get further matter against me...." 267
At the time Archbishop John Whitgift, who became head of
the High Commission in 1583, and his fellow commissioners
started on their crusade against heresy this much was fairly well
established: one was entitled to be accused formally and to know
the charges; and one did not have to submit to inquiry about one's
secret thoughts and deeds. Also as a matter of practice one usually
knew who one's accusers were and, in a nonpolitical criminal case,
was confronted with them. Of course, once one had been formally
charged one could be and was questioned. This was true in lay
as well as ecclesiastical proceedings. So far as questioning an accused was concerned, one of the main differences between a lay
criminal trial and a case before the high commission was that in a
lay criminal trial a defendant was not put under oath. However,
from a _rational point of view this difference is not a substantial one:
questioning is questioning whether one is put under oath _or not.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 162-163.
267 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 at 1321 (1637).
265
266
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But if one had the right to be formally and openly charged and
·could not be questioned on one's secret thoughts and deeds, and if
one as a matter of practice usually knew one's accusers and was
confronted with them, the next step followed naturally: one could
not be made to accuse one's self. This was the step the English
people took to resist the pursuit of heresy which Whitgift and his
:successors carried on.
In composing their argument against the oath ex officio the
Puritans and their Ia-wyers made use of a phrase which they borrowed from an opinion of nine English canonists, one of whom was
Richard Cosin, a leading civil lawyer. These canonists about the
middle of Elizabeth I's reign prepared a short treatment on the
practice in ecclesiastical courts in England and the use of the oath
ex officio. They conceded that "no man may be urged to bewray
himself in hidden and secret crimes; or simply therein to accuse
himself."268 Then they discussed the inquisitio procedure of the
church, in the course of which they stated the safeguards which
theoretically accompanied it: "Licet nemo tenetur seipsum

prodere; tamen proditus per famam, tenetur seipsum ostendere,
utrum possit suam innocentiam ostendere, et seipsum purgare.''269
The Puritans and their counsel took the "nemo tenetur seipsum
prodere" and in the course of the next century made it into a household phrase, in the colonies as well as in the mother country. At
first they tied it to the "nisi in causis matrimonialibus vel testamentariis" of the order of 1246 of Henry III to Grosseteste and the
"Prohibitio formata de statuto articuli cleri" of Edward II (13071327);2•0 but after 1640, the year the Long Parliament convened, a
turning point year in an eventful century for the English people,
the phrase was used by itself. On every hand and in every court
people simply claimed that no one was bound to be his own accuser.
A striking claim of privilege occurred in 1670 in the trial of
William Penn and William Mead, who were indicted for preaching to~ tumultuous assembly and disturbing the peace. The Penn
in this case was the one who later founded Pennsylvania. Mead in
refusing to answer the recorder's question whether he was present
268 3 Sm.YJ>E,

THE LIFE AND ACTS OF JOHN WHITCIFr appx. at •136 (1822).
Id. at •137. "Though no one is bound to become his own accuser, yet when once
a man has been accused by general report, he is bound to show whether he can prove his
innocence and to vindicate himself." See Wigmore, "Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere," 5
HAR.v. L. REv. 71 at 83 (1891).
270 See articles cited in notes 247 and 249 supra.
269
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at the meeting, stated vividly: "It is a maxim of your own law,
'Nemo tenetur accusare seipsum,' which if it be not true Latin, I
am sure it is true English, 'That no man is bound to accuse himself.' And why dost thou offer to insnare me with such a question?"
The recorder answered, "Sir, hold your tongue, I did not go about
to insnare you.'' 271 The jurors returned a verdict in which they
stated that Penn and Mead were guilty of speaking but refused to
find them guilty of what they were charged. The court tried to
browbeat the jurors into a verdict of guilty, with the result that
they ended up finding both Penn and Mead not guilty.272
It was this history and this approach to deviants which was embodied in the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. The same approach has continued to the present time, in
England as well as this country. In 1848 Parliament passed a
statute, known as Sir John Jervis' Act, which specifically required
a justice of the peace to advise an accused person before him in a
preliminary proceeding of his right to remain silent at such an
examination. The act provided that he "shall say to him these
Words, or Words to the like Effect: 'Having heard the Evidence,
do you wish to say anything in answer to the Charge?-you are not
obliged to say anything unless you desire to do so, but whatever
you say will be taken down in Writing, and may be given in
Evidence against you at your 'Trial'... .''278
In 1912 the judges at the request of the Home Secretary drew
up some rules as guides for police officers. These rules provided
in part:
"2. Whenever a police officer has made up his mind to
charge a person with a crime he should first caution such person before asking any questions or any further questions as
the case may be:
2716 How. St. Tr. 951 at 957-958 (1670).
212 Id. at 966. The court was incensed at the verdict of not guilty, fined the jurors 40
marks apiece, and had them committed until the fine was paid. Id. at 967-968. Thereupon the jurors got a writ of habeas corpus returnable to the court of common pleas and
were discharged. Bushell's Case, Vaugh. 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 6 How. St. Tr. 999
(1670). The court unanimously decided that their commitment was illegal. The opinion
of the court on the request of all the judges was by Chief Justice Sir John Vaughan. On
appeal the judgment was reversed on the ground that the case, being a criminal one, was
not cognizable by the court of common pleas. I HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
lid ed., 345 (1922). However, Vaughan's opinion was such a sound one that it was thereafter regarded as representing the law. A newsletter account of the opinion stated that it
, was "business of great concernment and much talked of." 8 ENGLISH · HISTo1t1CAL DocuMENTS 86 (1953). Thus trial jurors indeed became judges of the facts.
278 11 &: 12 Viet., c. 42, §18 (1848).
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"3. Persons in custody should not be questioned without
the usual caution being first administered.
"4. If the prisoner wishes to volunteer any statement the
usual caution should be administered...." 274
These rules are known as the Judges' Rules. Subsequently,
the judges issued some more. The first sentence of Rule 7
specified: "A prisoner making a voluntary statement must not be
cross-examined, and no questions should be put to him about it
except for the purpose of removing ambiguity in what he has
actually said."275
In 1929 a Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures,
which had been appointed the preceding year, made a report in
which it recommended, among other things:
"Questioning of Persons in Custody.
(xlviii) a rigid instruction should be issued to the Police that
no questioning of a prisoner, or a 'person in custody,' about
any crime or offence with which he is, or may be, charged,
should be permitted. This does not exclude questions to remove elementary and obvious ambiguities in voluntary statements, under No. (7) of the Judges' Rules, but the prohibition
should cover all persons who, although not in custody, have
been charged and are out on bail while awaiting trial." 276
A case and an anecdote will illustrate the English approach
to deviants. In 1935 in the case of Rattenbury and Stoner, who
were on trial for murder, the former, whose husband had been the
victim, had stated at the time of her arrest that she had done it and
that the murder weapon had been a mallet. The arresting officer
did not follow up these .statements with any question. Defense
counsel asked him why not, and this colloquy took place:
"Mr. Justice Humphreys: Do you really suggest, Mr.
O'Connor, if after a woman has said-believe it or not-that
she was a party to a crime like this, the police officer would be
justified in cross-examining her at all?
"Mr. O'Connor: I accept your lordship's suggestion at once,
and apologise for the question." 277
274 They

are set out in a note to Rex v. Voisin, (1918] l K.B. 531 at 539, n.3.
71 n. (Cmd.

276 REPoRT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON POLICE POWERS AND PROCEDURES

3297, 1929).
276 Id. at IIS.
277 TRIAL OF RATTENBURY

AND STONER

126-127 (Jesse ed. 1935).
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The anecdote is about a British constable on the witness stand
who was asked whether it was not true that the accused had made
a statement. He answered: "No: he was beginning to do so; but
I knew my duty better, and I prevented him." 278
In this country seven American states, Virginia, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, North Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts and New
Hampshire, had put a guarantee of the right to remain silent in
their constitutions or bills of rights before the ad.option of the
Fifth Amendment.279 Today, in addition to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of this right, all but two states, Iowa and New
Jersey, have similar constitutional provisions; and in these two
states this right also obtains, in one, Iowa, by judicial decision, 28 0and in the other by statute as well as judicial decision. 281 Many
states have statutory as well as constitutional provisions.282
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of a right of
silence is one provision which the federal courts have interpreted
even more liberally than the provisions of the First Amendment.
For instance, although the Fifth Amendment's guarantee relates by
its terms to a criminal case, the Supreme Court in Counselman v.
Hitchcock 283 by a liberal interpretation extended it to a grand jury
proceeding, pointing out through Justice Blatchford that this provision "must have a broad construction in favor of the right which
it was intended to secure."284 Recent cases, including two in the
Supreme Court, Emspak v. United States285 and Quinn v. United
States,286 have applied it to proceedings before congressional committees.287 The Supreme Court cases involved Thomas Quinn
and Julius Emspak, members of the Unit~d Electrical Workers.
In both cases the Court not only sustained claims of the privilege
278 FORSYTH, HoRTENSIUS nm ADVOCATE 282, n.l

(1882).
Pittman, "The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination in America," 21 VA. L. REv. 763 at 764-765 (1935).
280 State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902). See Koenck v. Cooney, 244
Iowa 153 at 157, 55 N.W. (2d) 269 (1952).
281 See State v. Fary, 19 N.J. 431, 117 A. (2d) 499 (1955); In re Pillo, 11 N.J. ·a, 93 A.
(2d) 176 (1952); In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 67 A. (2d) 141 (1949); State v. Grundy, 136
N.J.L. 96 at 97, 54 A. (2d) 793 (1947); State v. Miller, 71 N.J.L. 527 at 532, 60 A. 202
(1904); State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 619 at 622, 55 A. 743 (1903). The statutory provisions are now N.J. Stat. Ann. (1951) §2A:81-5 and 6.
282 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2252, n.3 (1940).
283 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
284 Id. at 562.
285 349 U.S. 190 (1955), reversing (D.C. Cir. 1952) 203 F. (2d) 5'l.
286 349 U.S. 155 (1955), reversing (D.C. Cir. 1952) 203 F. (2d) 20.
287 See note 12 supra (55 MICH. L. REv. 163 at 166).
279
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before a congressional committee, but did so even though they
were based only secondarily on the Fifth Amendment. Emspak.
in refusing to answer certain questions explained: "Because of the
hysteria, I think it is my duty to endeavor to protect the rights
guaranteed under the Constitution, primarily the first amendment,
supplemented by the fifth. This Committee will corrupt those
rights." 288 Quinn adopted the statement of another, 289 Thomas J.
Fitzpatrick, a member of his union. Fitzpatrick commented at
one point: "This is a protection of the First Amendment to the
Constitution, supplemented by the Fifth Amendment." Another
time he said: "I stand on the protection of the Constitution, the
First and Fifth Amendments."290 The opinions in both cases were
by Chief Justice Warren. In the Quinn case, after pointing out
that the guarantees in the federal Constitution were to be accorded
a liberal construction he continued: "Such liberal construction is
particularly warranted in a _prosecution of a witness for a refusal
to answer, since the respect normally accorded the privilege is then
buttressed by the presumption of innocence accorded a defendant
in a criminal trial. To apply the privilege narrowly or begrudgingly-to treat it as an historical relic, at most merely to be tolerated
-is to ignore its development and purpose."291
•
In line with this sympathetic application of the Fifth Amendment's right of silence, the Supreme Court, at the last term, in
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education292 held that section 903
of New York City's charter was invalid because it made the claim
of a right of silence an automatic basis for the termination of one's
employment. Slochower was an associate professor of German at
Brooklyn College. The Court ruled: " ... The privilege against
self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its
exercise could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt
or a conclusive presumption of perjury.... There has not been
the 'protection of the individual against arbitrary action' which
Mr. Justice Cardozo characterized as the very essence of due process."203
288 349
289 349
290 203

U.S. 190 at 193, n.3 (1955). (Italics the Court's.)
U.S. 155 at 158, and n.8 (1955).
F. (2d) 20 at 23 (1952). Fitzpatrick was held properly to have claimed his
Fifth Amendment privilege. United States v. Fitzpatrick, (D.C. D.C. 1951) 96 F. Supp. 491.
291 349 U.S. 155 at 162 (1955).
292 350 U.S. 551 (1956), reversing Daniman v. Board of Education, 306 N.Y. 532, I 19
N.E. (2d) 373 (1954).
298 Id. at 557 and 559.
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The federal courts have interpreted the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee of a right of silence in the spirit of Justice Bradley's
comment in Boyd v. United States:294
'' ... And any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's
oath, or compelling the production of his private books and
papers, to convict him of crime or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to
the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts
of an American. It may suit the purposes of despotic power;
but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty
and personal freedom. " 295
They have interpreted it in the spirit of Justice Rutledge's observation in 1942 while on the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in Woods v. United States:296
" ... With world events running as they have been, there is
special reason at this time for not relaxing the old personal
freedoms won, as this one was, through centuries of struggle.
Men now in concentration camps could speak to the value of
such a privilege, if it were or had been theirs. There is in it
the wisdom of centuries, if not that of decades.
"Large in this is a sense of fairness to the person accused, a
respect for his individual integrity, in accusation or even in
guilt. But larger still is the sense of the court's own part in
justice and ~ts administration. By this we mean the sense of
the citizen as well as of the court itself...." 297
In the past half decade the federal courts have sustained a
claim of the right of silence in more than fifty reported cases,298
and many more unreported ones. Most of the persons under attack were believed or felt to be communists. A number were persons whom the Kefauver Committee sought to interrogate and who
294116 U.S. 616 (1886).
631-632.
D.C. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 265.
.
278-279. Starkie explained that the privilege was based on a principle of
humanity as well as of policy; of humanity because any other course would "extort a
confession of the truth by a kind of duress, every species and degree of which the law
abhors." EVIDENCE, 10th Am. ed., •41 (1876).
298 Trock v. United States, 351 U.S. 976 (1956); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190
(1955); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Singleton v. United States, 343 U.S.
944 (1952); Brunner v. United States, 343 U.S. 918 (1952); Greenberg v. United States,
343 U.S. 918 (1952); Greenberg v. United States, 341 U.S. 944 (1951); Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Irving Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); Patricia
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); Estes v. Potter, (5th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 865,
cert. den. 340 U.S. 920 (1951); Kasinowitz v. United States, (9th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 632,
295 Id. at
296 (D.C.
297 Id. at
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were accused of being racketeers. In a case involving suspected
communists, Judge Delbert E. Metzger in Hawaii declared: "And
I can't see any actual difference, whether the proceeding was before a grand jury or committee of the House of Representatives,
and any other inquisitive body . . . the Constitution stands there
like the rock of Gibraltar. It has the same force and effect, to my
mind, whether a proceeding is before a grand jury or any other
body.''299 In a case involving a suspected racketeer, Judge Herbert
F. Goodrich, in writing the opinion for the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in Philadelphia commented: "If our conclusion
permits, in the individual case, a rascal to go unwhipped or a villain unhung, it is because Americans have thought it better policy
to lose a conviction now and then than to force a conviction from
the defendant's own mouth."300
In another recent case301 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in holding a state prisoner entitled to a ·writ of habeas
corpus because of his conviction in a state court proceeding on
confessions that the court deemed inadmissible, said, through Judge
Jerome N. Frank:
" ...·It has no significance that in this case we must assume
there was no physical brutality. For psychological torture
may be far more cruel, far more symptomatic of sadism. Many
a man who can endure beatings will yield to fatigue. To keep
a man awake beyond the point of exhaustion, while constantly
cert. den. 340 U.S. 920 (1951); Ballantyne v. United States, (5th Cir. 1956) 237 F. (2d) 657;
United States v. Courtney, (2d Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 921; United States v. Gordon, (2d
Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 916; United States v. Rosen, (2d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 187, cert.
den. 338 U.S. 851 (1949); Powell v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 269; Krogmann v. United States, (6th Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 220; Carroll v. Savoretti, (5th Cir. 1955)
220 F. (2d) 910; Daly v. United States, (1st Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 232; Mallie v. United
States, (1st Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 225; Kiewal v. United States, (8th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d)
I; United States v. Coffey, (3d Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 438; United States v. Girgenti, (3d
Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 218; Doran v. United States, (9th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 489; Alex•
ander v. United States, (9th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 480; Application of House, (N.D. Cal.
1956) 144 F. Supp. 95; United States v. Hoag, (D.C. D.C. 1956) 142 F. Supp. 667; Applica·
tion of Daniels, (S.D. N.Y. 1956) 140 F. Supp. 322; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Logsdon,
(W.D. Ky. 1955) 18 F.R.D. 57; United States v. Vadner, (E.D. Pa. 1954) 119 F. Supp. 330;
United States v. Malone, (N.D. Cal. 1953) 111 F. Supp. 37; In re Friedman, (S.D. N.Y. 1952)
104 F. Supp. 419; United States v. Steffen, (N.D. Cal. 1951) 103 F. Supp. 415; and cases
cited note 12 supra. But cf. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (doctrine of
waiver).
299 United

States v. Yukio Abe, (D.C. Hawaii, Jan. 16, 1951) 19 U.S. Law Week 2321,

2322.
800United States v. Girgenti, (3d Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 218 at 221.
801 United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, (2d Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 698, cert.
den. 350 U.S. 896 (1955). Cf. Brock v. United States, (5th Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 681.
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pummelling him with questions is to degrade him, to strip him
of human dignity, to deprive him of the will to resist, to
make him a pitiable creature mastered by the single desireat all costs to be free of torment. Any member of this or any
other court, to escape such anguish would admit to almost any
crime. Indeed, the infliction of such psychological punishment is more reprehensible than a physical attack: It leaves no
discernible marks on the victim. Because it is thus concealed,
it has, under the brutalitarian regimes, become the favorite
weapon of the secret police, bent on procuring confe~sions
as a means of convicting the innocent."302
A long view establishes that the right of silence grew steadily
from the early English opposition to the inquisitional technique.
The insistence on being formally presented with charges and on
knowing one's accusers, to which was added the practice of confrontation, led naturally and logically to the position that one was
not bound to accuse one's self. Thus under our system deviants
acquired a right of silence. The four dissenters (Justices Shiras,
Gray, White and Field) in Brown v. Walker,3° 3 the first federal
Supreme Court decision sustaining the government's position under an immunity act, and the two dissenters (Justices Douglas and
Black) in United States v. Ullmann,304 turn out to have had a
better understanding of this right than the majority. A proper
regard for the nature of this right should lead one to the position
which Justice Douglas took in writing the dissent in the Ullmann
case: "My view is that the Framers put it beyond the power of
Congress to compel anyone to confess his crimes.... The critical
point is that the Constitution places the right of silence beyond the
reach of government." 30 r; Especially should this be true in the
area of heresy, the very area in which this right had its growth.

Utility of Immunity Acts
Apart from constitutional and policy objections to immunity
acts, there is a question as to their utility. A study of confessions
802 Id. at 701.
303161 U.S. 591 (1896).
804 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
.
305 Id. at 445 and 454. Compare Chief Judge Magruder's statement in Maffie v. United
States, (1st Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 225 at 227 (one of the cases arising out of a grand jury
investigation into the Brink's robbery in Boston in 1950): " •.• If it be thought that the
privilege is outmoded in the conditions of this modem age, then the thing to do is to take
it out of the Constitution, not to whittle it down by the subtle encroachments of judicial
opinion."
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indicates that the results expected from such statutes may be largely illusory. A majority of deviants will confess without them. On
the other hand, confirmed rebels will not confess even with them.
For example, in the Rosenberg3° 6 case, involving espionage, Harry
Gold and David Greenglass confessed without any immunity
statute, but Julius and Ethel Rosenberg did not confess and would
not have done so even if there had been an immunity statute with
a death penalty attached to it.
For the purpose of detecting the authors of forbidden acts immunity statutes are not necessary, because human beings whether
innocent or guilty of the acts in question have a compulsion to
confess to something in any event. Confessions have an appeal to
those that give them and an interest for the rest of us. Why did
the Catholic church progress? One of the reasons was the practice
of auricular confession, another of the tremendous changes of
Innocent III, who also devised the inquisitional technique. Why
did Parson Weems' fictional story about the boy George Washington chopping down his father's cherry tree become universally
popular in this country? Because it involved a confession. Why
have a majority of the guilty as well as many of the innocent confessed to the commission of offenses? Because of the compulsion
to confess. How have the communists obtained such a multitude
of confessions, many of which they are now confessing to be false?
In part it is because of this same compulsion. No human characteristic is more general than the compulsion to confess. There
are confessions in court and out of court, in church and out of
church, in life and in literature, and yet a multitude of others.
There are those which are consciously given and those which are
unconsciously supplied. Even the common human failing of talking too much involves the same compulsion.
It may come as a surprise to many, but the majority of defendants in criminal cases enter pleas of guilty or comparable pleas. In
the 86 United States district courts having purely federal jurisdiction the number of defendants in such cases during the seven-year
period ending June 30, 1954 who pleaded either guilty or nolo
contendere amounted to the surprising figure of 224,920 out of a
total of 268,620. Of the remainder, 23,274 were dismissed, 6,988
806 United States v. Rosenberg, (2d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 583, cert. den. 344 U.S. 838
(1952), stay of execution granted 346 U.S. 313 (1953) Gustice Douglas), stay of execution
vacated, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
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were acquitted, and 13,438 were convicted.307 Reduced to percentages this means, if one excludes the defendants who were dismissed, the astounding figure of 91.67 percent for those• who
pleaded either guilty or nolo contendere. If one includes the
defendants who were dismissed the figure becomes 83. 70 percent.
These figures exclude those charged as juvenile delinquents but
include immigration cases. The immigration cases were almost
entirely confined to the five federal districts touching the Mexican
border and the pleas of guilty of defendants in these cases amounted
to almost 98 percent. If immigration cases are omitted the figure
becomes 87 .67 percent, if one excludes the defendants who were
dismissed, and 77.16 percent, if one includes them. The story in
our state courts cannot be far different, although here one is handicapped by a lack of statistics. Some of the best state court statistics
are now being kept by the Administrative Office of the Courts of
New Jersey, but even these are not yet as good as the federal statistics. According to the New Jersey statistics it would appear that in
the three-year period ending August 31, 1954 the number of defendants who pleaded either guilty or non vult exceeded by more
than two and a half times the number who went to trial.308
Because of the compulsion to confess, many communists and excommunists have confessed: communists in communist countries
and ex-communists here. We are not aware of most of the ex-communist confessants in this country, for we do not hear about them.
They usually acquire a status of confidential informants and secret
witnesses-there are many types of determinations today, such as
those relating to loyalty and security questions, the status of aliens,
draft classifications, and the black.listing of organizations in which
one has not to date been held entitled to face one's accusers.309
307 These figures came from information supplied me by the Administrative Office ot
the United States Courts in communications of June 5, 1953 and December 16, 1954.
sos An estimate based on information supplied me by the Administrative Office of the
Courts in communications of June II, 1953 and December IO, 1954. The New Jersey sta•
tistics are compiled in the form of •·cases." A case is a separate charge against an individ•
ual defendant. Thus IO charges against one defendant equal IO cases, and one charge
against IO defendants equals IO cases. For the two-year period ending August 31, 1954
the number of cases in which there were pleas either of guilty or non vult amounted to
7209, whereas the number of cases that went to trial amounted but to 2725.
300 Washington v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 923 (1951), affirming 182 F. (2d) 375 (1950)
(loyalty investigation); Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), affirming 182 F. (2d) 46
(1950) (ibid); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)
(attorney general's blacklist of organizations, compiled without any hearings); Adler v.
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (Feinberg Law of New York, relating to the
public school system, which provided that the board of regents was to establish its own
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However, a number of ex-communists have appeared as witnesses
in public hearings of legislative committees or have been used as
witnesses against their former associates in criminal and other
cases, and these individuals we do know about. The three such
who have been the most publicized are Louis F. Budenz, Elizabeth
T. Bentley, and Whittaker Chambers. These three have confessed
to all manner of offenses, and named many former associates.
Moreover, as time went on, their stories grew. Take, for example,
Budenz. First he wrote a book, This Is My Story, published in
1947. Then he testified on three separate occasions-in 1947 before the House Committee on Education and Labor, in 1948 in a
perjury case, and in 1950 in a retrial of the same case, against
Harold Roland Christoffel,310 a labor leader in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In his book he did not mention Christoffel at all. By the
time of the first perjury trial he had made Christoffel into one of
the key revolutionaries in this country and party to a plot to overthrow our government by force and violence. At the second trial
he added still more details to those he had given at the first one.
Now of course a witness may actually have his recollection refreshed.
However, one cannot but wonder in such cases as that of Budenz
how much was actual recollection and how much was imagined
recollection in order to accommodate and please our authorities.
At any rate they all confessed to the commission of offenses and
named former associates.311
'\Ve not only have ex-communists who confessed, but we also
have those who confessed and then confessed that their confessions
blacklist of organizations and in so doing to make use of any similar authorized blacklist
of any federal agency or authority); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. M_ezei, 345 U.S.
206 (1953) (alien resident of this country seeking to return after a trip abroad held entitled to no hearing at all); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537
(1950) (alien war bride held entitled to no hearing); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160
(1948) (alien ordered banished without ·a hearing); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952)
(alien denied bail without a hearing); United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. I (1953) (draft
status of conscientious objector); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956) (exercise of attorney
general's discretionary power of suspension of deportation of an alien).
810 Christoffel's first conviction was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in
the last opinion which Justice Murphy wrote. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84
(1949) reversing (D.C. Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 1004. The Supreme Court divided five to
four. On a retrial Christoffel was convicted again. He again appealed and the Supreme
Court again sent the case back to the trial court, but this time for re-sentencing rather
than another trial. Christoffel v. United States, 345 U.S. 947 (1953), vacating judgment,
(D.C. Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 734. For a discussion of the first Christoffel trial, see ROGGE,
OUR VANISHING CIVIL LIBERTIES, C. 15 (1949).
.
s11 On Chambers, see his book WrrNESS (1952); and Comrn, A GENERATION ON TIUAL
(1950).
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were false. Examples are Harvey Matusow, Mrs. Marie Natwig,
Lowell Watson and David Brown. Indeed, Matusow's different
stories have added to the government's difficulties in its efforts to
deal with subversion. Because of his alleged false testimony and
that of two other government witnesses, Paul Crouch and Manning Johnson, the Supreme Court at the last term in Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board312 refused to sustain
holdings in favor of the government, and sent the case back to the
Subversive Activities Control Board for reconsideration. This
case was the first one under Title I of the Internal Security Act of
1950. Title I was officially designated as the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950, and required "Communist-action" and "Communist-front" organizations to register with the attorney general.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a
two-to-one decision sustained its validity.313 Also because of Matusow's recantations two of the convicted defendants in the second
Foley Square Smith Act prosecution against leaders of the American Communist Party obtained a new trial.314
Ex-communist confessants and other informants have in all
likelihood already told the government most of the story of the
communist conspiracy which can be obtained from persons in this
country. Indeed of the confessions of ex-communists at this point
we would seem to have enough and to spare. What part of the
small balance of the story that remains to be told can be obtained
from those who have not yet talked is problematical, and so is its
worth. The ones who have so far refused to talk are largely confirmed rebels. A number of them, like Julius and Ethel Rosen812 351 U.S. 115 (1956), reversing
313 It would seem, however, that

(D.C. Cir. 1954) 223 F. (2d) 531.
on the constitutional question the dissenting judge,
David L. Bazelon, had the better of the argument: "Suppose an Act of Congress required
bands of bank robbers to file with the Attorney General statements of their memberships
and activities, and imposed criminal penalties upon their leaders and members for failure.
to do so. Such an Act would compel individuals to disclose their connection with a criminal conspiracy. No argument could reconcile such an Act with the Fifth Amendment's
command...." (D.C. Cir. 1954) 223 F. (2d) 531 at 576.
814 United States v. Flynn, (S.D. N.Y. 1955) 130 F. Supp. 412. They were Alexander
Trachtenberg and George Blake Charney. In United States v. Flynn, (S.D. N.Y. 1955) 131
F. Supp. 742, the court denied a motion of the remaining eleven convicted defendants for
reargument, of their motion for a new trial. In 1956 Trachtenberg and Charney were
retried and again convicted. N.Y. TIMES, Aug. I, 1956, p. 1:3, p. 52:3.
Matusow and Natwig were convicted of perjury. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1956, p. 7:5-6;
Natwig v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 694. Matusow was also held in
contempt of court in Texas for recanting testimony which he had previously given there,
but this.judgment was reversed on appeal. Matusow v. United States, (5th Cir. 1956) 229 F.
(2d) 335.
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berg, would not talk under any circumstances. An immunity act
may make a few talk who otherwise would not. If we had an inquisitional system such as the communists do we could get still
more confessions, but would we want them? Certainly we should
want no additional confessions such as those of Harvey Matusow.
Even more surely we should want no confessions like those of
Laszlo Rajk, formerly minister of the interior and then minister
of foreign affairs of Hungary, and numerous others which the comm~mists are now admitting to be false.
The futility of the new federal act so far as congressional witnesses are concerned was ably described in the Minority Report in
the House on S. 16:
''What legislative lack does section (a) and (b) of the reported bill fill? ... It is not the function of Congress to prepare
cases for prosecution. It is not the function of Congress to
relieve the executive branch of the Government of its constitutional responsibility of law enforcement. When a committee
of Congress investigates, it does so to gather evidence for its
own purposes, that of legislating wisely and adequately. The
investigations of Pearl Harbor, Teapot Dome, the work of the
Truman Defense Committee and the LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee did not suffer for lack of congressional power
to immunize witnesses. In the areas of treason, sabotage,
espionage, ... the Communist conspiracy, etc., the Congress
has not heretofore hesitated to legislate, though lacking the
power of immunization, session after session in its history.
"The sought-after evidence of the recalcitrant witness can
now give us-what? More of the same thing? The facts of
the evil and danger of the international Communist conspiracy have been spread before the Congress by a march of
voluntary witnesses, ranging from employees of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to the ubiquitous ex-Communists.
Beyond that lie only the exposure and prosecution of guilt,
which is the business of the executive."315
The experience of the Department of Justice to date under
the new act would seem to bear out the views in the Minority Report on the act's worth. When the decision in the Ullmann case
became final the defendant advised the district court that he wanted
to purge his contempt by appearing before the grand jury and
answeri~g the questions previously put to him. Ullmann was a
sui H.R. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 12 (1954).
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former Treasury Department official whom Elizabeth Bentley had
linked with an espionage ring which Nathan Gregory Silvermaster,
another Treasury·Department official, assertedly headed. Another
alleged member of this ring was Harry Dexter White. Ullmann,
after his purging grand jury appearance, issued this statement to
the press:
" ... As I have done in the past, I have again denied participating in espionage and have denied knowing anyone who
has. I have denied ever being a member of the Communist
party and have denied knowledge of Communist party- activities on the part of others.
"I have specifically denied knowledge of the things which
my former superior, the late Harry Dexter White, has· been
charged with-and believe, in fact, that he was a great and
faithful public servant."316
Now that the authorities had his answers they were not happy
with them. The grand jury wanted his contempt sentence held
over his head until he gave more satisfactory ones. However,
Judge Weinfeld told them that if they felt Ullmann had committed
perjury they could take appropriate action.317
Nor did the department make much headway with its second
reported case under the new act. The individual was Edward J.
Fitzgerald, a former government economist and researcher whom
Elizabeth Bentley named as a member of an alleged Victor Perlo
espionage group. He remained silent and announced that he was
going to carry his case to the Supreme Court too. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his sentence on the basis
of the Ullmann decision. 318
· ·
·
However,. the House Committee on Un-American Activities
apparently h;;td somewhat more success with the new act. One of
its witnesses, Ellis Olim, a municipal employee in Chjcago, announced that under a grant of immunity he would reply. ~o questions he previously had refused to answer.319
Nevertheless, with or without the new act, some politie;;tl
deviants will remain wholly uncooperative, as were the RosenMay 26, 1956, p. 7:3-5.
June 2, 1956, p. 8:2.
318 United States v. Fitzgerald, (2d Cir. 1956) 235 F. (2d) 453, cert. den. 352 U.S. 842
(1956).
819 N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1955, p. 33:4-5.. .
810 N.Y. TIMES,

817 N.Y. TIMES,
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bergs, others will be insufficiently cooperative in the eyes of the
.authorities, as was Ullmann, and yet others will be overly cooperative, and overly submissive, as were Matusow, Crouch and too many
more. The new act may even worsen this situation. It has been
highly overrated.
Moreover, in order to try to reach the illusion of the additional
information which such acts hold out to us we take a step in the
direction of the inquisitional technique, and degrade individuals
by giving them the choice either of confessing their sins and naming their associates or going to jail. We give up part of our birthright for less than a mess of pottage. The compulsory confession of
one's sins and the naming of one's associates may be standard operating procedure in authoritarian regimes, but it is unbecoming a
free people.

Conclusion
Immunity acts are a mirage which lead us from our accusatorial course with deviants to an inquisitional one. This in itself
is unfortunate, for our accusatorial method has helped us to develop a more independent and mature citizenry than will be found
in eastern countries. With us an individual does not have to be
submissive when the state points an accusing finger at him: he has
a right to remain silent, along with a right to counsel, to a formal
accusation, to bail in nearly all ~ases, to a public trial, to be confronted with his accusers, and to be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We should not let any of these rights atrophy, least
of all th:e right of silence,
Moreover, immunity acts are also a delusion. We think we are
going to get much additional information by the use of them,
when the truth of the matter is that in all probability we shall get
most of the information we want without them. We shall get this
information because human beings have a compulsion to confess
to something. Immunity acts are thus unnecessary. The government has most of the story of the communist conspiracy in this
country. An immunity act will add little, if anything, to our store
of knowledge in this field. By passing an immunity act in order to
obtain this possible additional mite we give up part of our heritage.
The cost is too great.
As far as the new federal act is concerned it is submitted that
paragraphs (a) and (b) relating to congressional witnesses are unconstitutional on the ground that the approval which paragraph
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(b) requires of federal district courts to proposed congressional
grants of immunity is a nonjudicial function. If there is to be such
an act the granting of immunity should not rest with the courts.
Nor should it rest with Congress. Rather it should rest with those
agencies of the executive branch of government which have to do
with the investigation and prosecution of offenses. With a little
more work by the Court the new federal act, despite the intent of
Congress, may ultimately be reduced to this form. So far the Court,
in the Ullmann case, has downgraded paragraph (c) relating to
witnesses before federal courts and grand juries to the point where
the granting of immunity in such instances really rests with the
Department of Justice. Now if the Court in an appropriate future
proceeding will eliminate paragraphs (a) and (b), then the only
effect of the new act will be to provide the Department of Justice
with an immunity act of its own.320 Many other arms of the executive branch already have them.
However, it is still to be regretted that compulsory testimony
provisions have been extended beyond the field of economic regulation into the field of belief and expression of opinions, a field
that with us has received an added measure of protection in the
First Amendment. The First Amendment freedoms have probably played the most important part in our political growth, and
we should not allow them to be eroded by an immunity act which
humors the current demand for cqnformity more than it serves any
other purpose.
820 Congress might then pass an immunity act for itself which would not require court
approval of proposed grants of immunity.

